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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell 
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Argued January 22, 2014 
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  Joseph Vincent White appeals the denial of his motion 
to suppress evidence of his unlawful possession of two 
firearms.  Because we conclude the District Court erred in its 
legal analysis, we vacate its order and remand for further 
proceedings.  
I 
A1
                                                 
1This appeal does not involve any challenge to the District 
Court’s findings of fact. 
  
 In the early morning of April 12, 2012, Pennsylvania 
State Police Troopers James John Hoban, Jr. and Travis Hill 
were radioed from their dispatch station about a potential 
domestic disturbance between a father and his daughter.  The 
dispatch supervisor stated “something to the effect of” 
someone “under the influence of drugs or alcohol” was 
“waving a loaded firearm around” and “dragging his daughter 
from room to room,” or may have been “barricaded inside the 
bathroom.”  (A67-68)  The daughter’s boyfriend had reported 
the incident to police, relaying information the daughter was 
sending him via text message.  The dispatcher further advised 
the troopers that the father was believed to be the defendant, 
White, who on a prior occasion had fought with the police 
and resisted arrest. 
 
 Within approximately 15 minutes, Troopers Hoban 
and Hill arrived at the residence, which was a trailer home 
with a mud room attached to the front.  The troopers observed 
two individuals looking out from behind the screen door of 
the mud room.  With their guns drawn, the troopers ordered 
both individuals to come outside.  The taller of the two – who 
turned out to be White – emerged first and walked unsteadily 
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towards the troopers, leading them to conclude he was 
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.  When White was 
at a distance of about 20 feet from the entrance to the home, 
the troopers instructed him to lay face down on the ground; 
White complied and was handcuffed.  Trooper Hill then 
escorted White to the police cruiser, which was parked farther 
away from the residence, conducted a pat down search, and 
found that White was not in possession of a firearm or any 
other weapon. 
 
 The second of the two individuals, White’s adult 
daughter, Samantha White, came out of the home slightly 
behind her father.  Samantha hesitated to come all the way 
towards the officers, instead remaining approximately five to 
ten feet away from the entrance to the residence.  Given her 
size and apparent victim status, Trooper Hoban decided there 
was no need to handcuff Samantha.  When he asked her if 
anyone was in the home, she responded there was not. 
 
 Trooper Hoban decided to check for himself.  As he 
walked into the front door of the mud room, Trooper Hoban 
saw two guns – a revolver and a shotgun – lying on the floor 
just inside the threshold, the same area in which the troopers 
had first seen White and Samantha upon arriving at the 
residence.  Trooper Hoban seized the guns, carried them to 
the police cruiser, and placed them in the trunk.  He then 
returned to the home and, with Samantha, walked through the 
rooms, finding no other person but observing several gun 
cases and a partly burnt marijuana cigarette, none of which he 
seized.    
 
 Additional troopers arrived on the scene.  At some 
point, an officer advised White of his Miranda rights and 
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asked whether he had any other firearms.  White stated he 
was a gun collector, owned many firearms, and had been 
carrying the guns because he believed there were people 
trying to kill him.  He also said he had shot at some animals 
on his property earlier that day.2  
 
 Weeks later, on May 4, 2012, after obtaining a search 
warrant based in part on the two firearms Trooper Hoban 
seized from inside the mud room of the home, police 
executed a search of the residence and seized 91 additional 
firearms. 
B 
 
 On August 8, 2012, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging 
White with unlawful possession of a firearm by a person 
previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g).  The charge was based on White’s possession of the 
revolver and shotgun uncovered during Trooper Hoban’s 
search.  White moved to suppress those two firearms plus the 
additional guns seized during execution of the search warrant, 
as well as any inculpatory statements he made.  Specifically 
with respect to the revolver and shotgun, White argued that 
                                                 
2Given its determination that the search was not unlawful, the 
District Court did not reach the issue of whether White’s 
statements should be suppressed as “fruits of the poisonous 
tree.”  See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 
(1988) (requiring suppression of evidence “acquired as an 
indirect result of [an] unlawful search, up to the point at 
which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so 
attenuated as to dissipate the taint”).  Given our disposition, 
there is no need for us to address this question either. 
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Trooper Hoban’s warrantless search of his home was 
unreasonable and violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
 After receiving extensive briefing on White’s motion, 
on November 30, 2012 the District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing at which both Troopers Hoban and Hill testified.  
Trooper Hoban explained that he entered White’s home “to 
make sure that there was no one inside the residence,” “just to 
see if there were any additional people inside the residence.”  
(A85, A89)  Hoban stated that he merely undertook “a 
cursory sweep of the residence,” “for everyone’s safety 
because of a report of a firearm and, also, for myself to 
determine that there was no one in need of medical attention 
inside the residence.”  (A84)  According to his testimony, he 
searched for people, not evidence, looking only for “an 
injured person or a person that could be a threat to myself;” 
he did not open drawers or look at papers.  (A84-85)  Trooper 
Hill, who was standing by the police cruiser talking with 
White while Trooper Hoban and Samantha walked through 
the home, corroborated that Hoban searched only “to make 
sure there was no one else inside injured or who was a threat 
to us.”  (A123) 
 
 White did not call any witnesses.  Neither party sought 
to argue the motion nor to file post-hearing submissions.  The 
District Court ruled from the bench and denied White’s 
motion. 
 
 Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Maryland 
v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), and our non-precedential 
decision in United States v. Latz, 162 F. App’x 113 (3d Cir. 
Dec. 27, 2005), the District Court held that Trooper Hoban’s 
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search was a lawful “search incident to the arrest,” which did 
not require reasonable suspicion in order to be lawful.  
(A142-43)  Finding Troopers Hoban and Hill “to be most 
credible” and “straight shooters, in all respect[s]” (A140; see 
also A141-42 (“I credit the testimony of Trooper Hoban and 
Trooper Hill . . . .”)), the District Court found that they 
encountered a situation “fraught with danger” (A141).  In 
turn, the District Court concluded that the dispatch report 
combined with what Hoban and Hill observed on the scene 
gave rise to “a profound objectively-reasonable concern about 
their safety.”  (A142)  Further, the “very limited search 
incident to the arrest” was undertaken “with great fidelity to 
[the officers’] Fourth Amendment duties,” and “that’s as far 
as we need to go here under the jurisprudence.”  (A143-44) 
 
C 
 
 On January 7, 2013, White pled guilty to the felon in 
possession of a firearm charge, expressly reserving his right 
to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.  On April 5, 
2013, the District Court sentenced White to 96 months of 
imprisonment.  He then timely filed this appeal, solely 
challenging the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  See generally United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 
164, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (reviewing District Court’s denial of 
suppression motion following conditional guilty plea). 
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 We “review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
determinations but exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s application of law to those facts.”  United States v. 
Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).  White’s appeal 
presents solely a question of law: whether it was correct to 
apply the analysis of Buie’s “prong 1” to the undisputed facts 
relating to the search of White’s home. 
 
III 
 
A 
 
 The District Court held that the warrantless search of 
White’s home was permitted under the first prong of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.  We 
disagree.  White’s arrest did not occur inside the home, but 
instead took place approximately 20 feet outside of it.  As we 
stated in Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 824 (3d Cir. 1997), 
“a sweep incident to an arrest occurring just outside the home 
must be analyzed under the second prong of the Buie 
analysis.”  Accordingly, for reasons we further explain below, 
we will vacate the District Court’s order. 
 
B 
 
 “The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that 
the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.’”  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. 
Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV).  “It 
is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
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directed.’”  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) 
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of 
Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see also Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. at 1414 (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, the home is first among equals.”).  Hence, the 
Fourth Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance to the 
house,” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), 
which “must be not only firm but also bright,” Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 
 A search of a house without a warrant issued on 
probable cause is generally unreasonable.  See Buie, 494 U.S. 
at 331.  However, there are several exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  In Buie, the Supreme Court articulated two such 
exceptions: 
 We . . . hold that as an 
incident to the arrest the officers 
could, as a precautionary matter 
and without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, look in 
closets and other spaces 
immediately adjoining the place 
of arrest from which an attack 
could be immediately launched.  
Beyond that, however, we hold 
that there must be articulable facts 
which, taken together with the 
rational inferences from those 
facts, would warrant a reasonably 
prudent officer in believing that 
the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger to 
those on the arrest scene. 
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Id. at 334.  Hence, Buie “prong 1” permits a warrantless 
search of a home “incident to an arrest” occurring in the 
home, provided that the search is limited to those places 
“immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an 
attack could be immediately launched.”  Buie’s “prong 2” 
authorizes a warrantless search of a home based on 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the areas being 
searched may “harbor[] an individual” who poses a danger to 
those present at the scene of the arrest.  “[R]easonable 
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance 
of the evidence.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 A warrantless search of a home is also permitted 
“when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also United 
States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
government argued in the District Court, and reiterates on 
appeal, that Trooper Hoban’s search was justified under Buie 
and further by the presence of “exigent circumstances.” 
 
 The District Court limited its analysis to Buie prong 1, 
denying White’s suppression motion based on its conclusion 
that Trooper Hoban’s warrantless search of White’s home 
was a limited and permissible search “incident to arrest,” not 
requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  We hold 
that Buie’s prong 1 exception is not available where the arrest 
took place “just outside the home,” just as we stated in 
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Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 824.  Here, it is undisputed that White 
was arrested approximately 20 feet outside of the entrance to 
his home.3  Hence, Buie prong 1 is not available and the 
search must be evaluated pursuant to the other exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. 
C 
 
 In Buie, the Supreme Court “decide[d] what level of 
justification is required by the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments before police officers, while effecting the arrest 
of a suspect in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant, may 
conduct a warrantless protective sweep of all or part of the 
premises.”  494 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added).  As we 
observed in Sharrar, “[t]he Supreme Court has never had the 
opportunity to apply its holding in Maryland v. Buie to 
protective sweeps incident to arrests made just outside the 
home.”  128 F.3d at 828 (emphasis added).  We were 
presented with this precise task in Sharrar.  After noting that 
“those circuits that have addressed the issue have uniformly 
held that . . . protective sweeps of the home in such situations 
are not per se unreasonable,” id. at 823, we found that our 
sister circuits all agreed that “a sweep incident to an arrest 
occurring just outside the home must be analyzed under the 
second prong of the Buie analysis,” id. at 824. 
 We then held:  
 Like our sister circuits, we 
see no reason to impose a bright 
line rule limiting protective 
sweeps to in-home arrests, as we 
                                                 
3No evidence was presented to contradict Trooper Hoban’s 
testimony that White was “approximately 20 feet” from the 
home’s entrance when he was arrested.  (A81, 98, 100) 
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agree . . . that “in some 
circumstances, an arrest taking 
place just outside a home may 
pose an equally serious threat to 
the arresting officers.”  [citing and 
quoting United States v. Colbert, 
76 F.3d 773, 776 (6th Cir. 1996)]  
Certainly, it would be imprudent 
to prohibit officers who are 
effecting an arrest or waiting until 
a warrant may be obtained from 
ensuring their safety and 
minimizing the risk of gunfire or 
other attack coming from inside 
the home if they have reason to 
believe that dangerous individuals 
are inside.  Therefore, in order to 
determine whether the protective 
sweep in question met the 
standard enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Buie, we must 
consider whether there was an 
articulable basis for a protective 
sweep, i.e., a warrantless search, 
under the circumstances at that 
time. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Our allusion to “an articulable basis for 
a protective sweep” was a direct reference to Buie’s second 
prong; no “articulable basis” is required for a search of an 
“immediately adjoining” space authorized by Buie prong 1.  
We adhere to our holding in Sharrar. 
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D 
 
 In the District Court, the parties did not frame the issue 
as being whether Buie’s first or second prong is applicable in 
light of Sharrar.  Understandably, then, the District Court 
provided no analysis on this point.4  Even had the District 
Court offered a persuasive rationale for us to reevaluate 
Sharrar’s holding, only the Court sitting en banc would have 
authority to do so.  See Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate 
Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Third Circuit 
Internal Operating Procedure (“IOP”) 9.1 (“[N]o subsequent 
panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a 
previous panel.  Court en banc consideration is required to do 
so.”). 
 
 On appeal, the government suggests several reasons 
why we should apply Buie’s prong 1 to this case.  Even were 
we not required to do so, we would reject the government’s 
reasoning. 
 
 Principally, the government emphasizes the District 
Court’s findings as to the danger of the situation confronted 
by the officers, and their “profound objectively-reasonable 
concern about their safety.”  (A141-42)  Accepting these 
                                                 
4Sharrar was discussed in White’s memorandum of law in 
support of his motion (see A29-31), but was not cited at all by 
the government in its written response (see A43-57) and was 
similarly not mentioned by the District Court in its bench 
ruling (A140-44). 
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findings,5 and recognizing that law enforcement personnel 
often face such situations and should not have to take 
unnecessary risks with their own lives and the lives of others, 
these realities do not require extending Buie’s prong 1 to 
arrests made outside the home.  When an arrest occurs just 
outside of the home, the unassailable public policy of 
protecting law enforcement officers, as well as victims, 
bystanders, and even assailants, is appropriately balanced 
with the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable 
searches and seizures by application of Buie’s prong 2. 
 
 The government also argues that Sharrar’s assessment 
that the Courts of Appeals uniformly agree as to the 
unavailability of Buie’s first prong for arrests outside the 
home is no longer correct (and may also not have been correct 
when we decided Sharrar).  The government directs us to 
post-Sharrar opinions from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits, all of which applied Buie’s prong 1.  (See Govt. Br. 
at 21-23)  None of these opinions, of course, is controlling.  
They are also distinguishable, as they did not involve a search 
of a home as an incident to an arrest that clearly took place at 
a distance outside the home.  See United States v. Lemus, 582 
F.3d 958, 960-63 (9th Cir. 2009) (arrest occurred either just 
after defendant “stepped into the apartment” or when 
defendant was only “partially outside the living room” in an 
area “immediately adjoining” the living room, permitting the 
living room to be searched incident to arrest); Peals v. Terre 
Haute Police Dep’t, 535 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 2008) (arrest 
occurred inside garage “immediately adjoining” a room of a 
home, permitting search of that room); United States v. 
                                                 
5We are not called on to determine whether the District 
Court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. 
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Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 405-06 (5th Cir. 2006) (arrest took 
place “just at the entrance” to an open storage unit – not a 
home – so the storage unit could be searched as an area 
“immediately adjacent to the site of the arrest”). 
 
 Finally, the government relies heavily on our non-
precedential opinion in United States v. Latz, 162 F. App’x 
113 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 2005), a case the District Court also 
found to be pertinent.  (A142)  Latz is not binding precedent.  
See IOP 5.7.  In any event, Latz is also distinguishable, as 
Latz’s arrest unfolded as he moved across the threshold of the 
home.  Unlike Latz, White was not arrested at or across the 
threshold of the home, nor in an area that was “immediately 
adjacent” to the front door, but rather 20 feet away from his 
house. 
 
 Accordingly, we repeat what we held in Sharrar: “a 
sweep incident to an arrest occurring just outside the home 
must be analyzed under the second prong of the Buie 
analysis.”  128 F.3d at 824.6 
 
E 
 
 In its brief, the government contended that, were we to 
conclude that Buie prong 1 does not justify the warrantless 
search that occurred here, we could affirm the District Court 
                                                 
6In Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2007), we 
observed that portions of Sharrar relating to qualified 
immunity had been abrogated by later precedents.  Neither 
Curley nor any other precedential opinion of this Court has 
altered Sharrar’s authority on the point for which we rely on it 
here. 
 16 
 
on the alternative grounds that Buie’s prong 2 or the “exigent 
circumstances” exception apply.  At oral argument, the 
government conceded that, alternatively, it would be 
appropriate to remand this case for further proceedings 
regarding reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances. 
 
 We have concluded that a remand is the preferable 
approach here.  On remand, the District Court will have to 
decide if the record is adequately developed to allow it to 
assess the applicability of the other exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  Even if additional evidentiary proceedings are 
unnecessary, we will benefit from having the District Court 
analyze these issues in the first instance. 
 
IV 
 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
denying White’s suppression motion and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
